| Adapted for the Internet from: Why God Doesn't Exist |
| A scientific definition is one that can be used consistently |
1.0 Do we need definitions in Science?
It is axiomatic that without definitions we would be unable to formulate hypotheses or explain theories.
Without them we cannot communicate ideas. This argument alone should place definitions in a more
prominent position than they enjoy today in science. The mainstream doesn’t even allude to definitions
indirectly in its definition of the term scientific method. So you wonder how the mathematicians pretend to
convey thoughts to an ET if they don’t define their terms first.
Our forefathers had a total disdain for definitions, in great measure, because they weren't able to define
anything scientifically. They never realized the importance of crisp definitions. Their frustration led them to
argue that it was actually a waste of time. Pascal was one who thought it unnecessary to define what he
regarded as self-evident words:
- " there is nothing more feeble than the discourse of those who wish to define these
primitive words [space, time, motion, and number]." [1]
- Why take the trouble to define such words, he asks, if we already know what they mean?
- " these terms so naturally designate the things that they mean, to those who
understand the language, that their elucidation would afford more obscurity than
instruction." [1]
Newton arrived at a similar opinion:
- " I do not define time, space, place and motion, as being well known to all." (p. 81) [2]
- But then their modern day followers claim that all of their theories and conclusions are founded on rigorous
definitions:
- " mathematics requires more precision than everyday speech. Mathematicians refer
to this precision of language and logic as ‘rigor’." [3]
" math is about making definitions" [4]
- As always, the mathematicians live with these contradictions and nobody raises an eyebrow.
Pascal and Newton were obviously not very bright individuals. They failed to realize the importance of
definitions to communicate ideas. There is no excuse for their feeble and unjustified declarations even in
their age. Perhaps in the 17th Century they knew what space, time, and numbers were, but, somehow we
seem to have lost this precious knowledge over the years. Not a single, contemporary, so-called ‘physicist’
can give you a straight-forward definition of what these words mean:
" Space…can't be defined via other quantities because there is nothing more
fundamental known at present." [5]
[Space is a quantity? I thought space was that black stuff the stars were stapled onto.
The mathematicians really ought to be placed in mental asylums!]
" Attempting to understand time has long been a prime occupation for philosophers
and scientists…it is difficult to provide an uncontroversial and clear definition of
time" [6]
" The meaning of ‘number’ is often clear from context" [7]
- In fact, it is more logical to argue the opposite, that if Pascal was so cocky-sure of what these words meant,
he should have flaunted his knowledge by documenting their meanings for us. Either he knows what time
is or he doesn’t. If he is one of those enlightened sages who ‘understands the language,’ what prevents him
from putting his thoughts into words? And if he does put his thoughts in writing, it destroys his reasoning
that defining time is a worthless pursuit. Only imbeciles fail to define their words and come up with such
lame excuses. They do so because they have no clue as to what they are talking about.
2.0 What is a definition?
Before a prosecutor defines a word that is going to make or break his theory, we must first understand what
a definition is. Unfortunately, when we look up this word, we find a bunch of synonyms:
- " A definition gives us the meaning of a word." [8]
" signification: The established meaning of a word." [9]
A definition is the meaning which is a signification. Great! What have we learned?
In his Metaphysics, Aristotle kicked a couple of ideas around, but ended up fumbling for a clue that failed to
brainstorm. At least two of Aristotle’s proposals can be eliminated right off the bat:
- " a definition is a sort of number" (Book VIII, Sec. 3) [10]
" a definition is a set of words which is one not by being connected together, like
the Iliad, but by dealing with one object." (Book VIII, Sec. 6) [10]
If a definition is a number, what number should we respectively assign to the words shirt, rock, and tree?
And if a definition is a set of words that deal with one object, does this make the Iliad a definition of the word
Troy? Neither attempt is very useful or accurate.
The mathematicians have entertained other notions of what a definition is supposed to be and which they
derived from Aristotle. These include the operational, the functional, and the descriptive definitions of
definition. Are any of these scientific? Can words defined according to these prescriptions be used
consistently in a dissertation?
3.0 We don't define objects in Science
Let's first establish that for the purposes of Science we cannot and don't define physical objects. An object
is something you point to and name. You point to a hairy globular object and say coconut. The ET marooned
on the island with you stares at the object you designated and associates the object with the sound you
uttered. This is the only time the word coconut qualifies as an object. Any usage beyond this summarily
converts coconut into a concept. Whether you describe a coconut or use it to explain something, you are
relating it to other objects. You are comparing size, speed, color, shape, etc.
A definition is an explanation and, in Science, we don’t explain objects. In Science, we visualize them. In
Science, we point to an image and name it, ideally with a single syllable. The only property an object has is
shape, the shape you are staring at. The word object is a category which includes only those words that
represent shapes. Bohr was one who was very close to discovering this tantalizing wisdom:
- " When it comes to atoms, language can be used only as in poetry. The poet, too, is not
nearly so concerned with describing facts as with creating images." Niels Bohr
- In Science, we can only define concepts, and here we come to terms with the fact that there are two types:
static and dynamic. Let's look at them separately and see if we can zero-in on the definition of the word
definition.
4.0 Static concepts
Since the days of Pythagoras and Plato, the idiots of Mathematics and Philosophy have relied on functional
or operational definitions to designate physical objects:
- " An operational definition is a showing of something — such as a variable, term,
or object — in terms of the specific process or set of validation tests used to
determine its presence and quantity." [11]
- The proponents are saying that if there is an invisible object, you determine that it exists by running an
experiment. A recent example is Gravity Probe B. The morons at NASA 'proved' that space is a physical
object -- a solid -- by measuring the friction a few gyroscopes experienced while moving through it. In like
manner, the bozos manning the accelerators have 'proven' the existence of particles they call virtual, a
particle that disappears and appears at will for no reason except to make the equations come out right. So
what is the shape of a virtual particle during those brief moments in which it is nothing? What is the shape
of space if it is a physical object?
The ‘operational’ way of defining words asks you to run an experiment, observe, and wait for the results.
The answers you get will tell you in retrospect what it is you were testing. You now know what the crucial
word in your theory 'meant.' The prosecutor waits till the end of the presentation to tell us in retrospect what
he was talking about. He doesn’t tell us what he’s gonna tell us. He tells us what he told us. Meanwhile, the
jury must sit through the rant without understanding anything:
- " An item like a brick, or even a photograph of a brick, may be defined in terms of
how it can be made. Likewise, iron may be defined in terms of the results of testing
or measuring it in particular ways. One simple, every day illustration of an operational
definition is defining a cake in terms of how it is prepared and baked (i.e., its recipe is
an operational definition)." [12]
" we build operational definitions for the words ‘particles’ and ‘waves.’ " [13]
" we explain what a carburetor is, in terms of how it interacts with ignition chambers
and with other things" [14]
[ A brick is the same thing as the process to make it? A cake is the same thing as a recipe?
A carburetor is what it does? I think I need another beer to understand all of this. These
things are over my head.]
- We can see how a posteriori 'operational' definitions can come in handy to the prosecution. For instance,
imagine asking someone to define the word 'giraffe' she just used in her theory. She replies, "Go to the zoo
and look for the tallest animal. That's what I meant by giraffe." And what is this thing called 'wave' that you
have been talking about for the past two hours? She replies,"Go to the ocean and observe what washes
onto the beach. That’s what I meant by wave. After a while, the jury gets the hang of it and realizes that the
prosecutor can explain anything with functional and operational definitions. The operational definition is
actually a proof disguised as a definition. That's why the mathematicians and the philosophers absolutely
love them.
So? Does the ‘operational’ definition work?
The conclusions reached by Harrison and Tonomura speak for themselves:
- " Finally, then, we have two contradictory yet complementary models of the two-slit
experiment for electrons. In one model the electron is a particle that somehow
exhibits an interference pattern. In the other model, the electron is a wave that
somehow manifests as a particle whenever we look at it." [15]
" interference fringes are formed only when electron waves pass through on both
sides of the electron biprism at the same time but nothing other than this. Whenever
electrons are observed, they are always detected as individual particles. When
accumulated, however, interference fringes are formed...We have reached a
conclusion which is far from what our common sense tells us." [16] [17]
[Yeah! No kidding!]
So much for operational definitions! It’s career re-directioning for both of you guys!
What should we have concluded if Harrison assumed initially that light is a particle and then carried out his
experiment and discovered that light behaved as a wave? According to Popper, this falsifies his particle
explanation (i.e., his theory). By relying on after-the-fact ‘operational’ definitions, Harrison has eluded this
control.
Operational definitions of physical objects are worthless garbage that the idiots of Mathematics and
their sidekicks, the philosophers, invented to explain any and every phenomenon. They are unscientific
because they are not used throughout the dissertation, but rather at the end. Harrison does not define on
his website what a wave or what a particle is. He merely provides experimental criteria to determine the
nature of a photon retroactively. His method fails because he still cannot tell you what light is. He just tells
you that if observation indicates that light behaved as a wave, then it probably was a wave throughout the
experiment. Functional and operational definitions are attempts to elude the scientific requirement of
defining words at the hypothesis stage. The scientific method doesn't work like that. The scientific method
absolutely requires the prosecutor to tell the jury in advance what his strategic terms mean so that the
jurors can follow the plot.
5.0 The scientific definition of definition
Descriptive definitions are similar to operational and functional definitions except that they are circumscribed
to static concepts. Thus, a table is:
- " An article of furniture supported by one or more vertical legs and having a flat
horizontal surface." [18]
Descriptive definitions differ from operational in that they address architecture as opposed to behavior. We
use adjectives rather than adverbs to describe. Behavior is not something we describe. It is something we
explain. A static concept must be defined before it can be used in a theory.
For example, if the prosecutor says big, white, and with wings, is he talking about a swan or the White
House?In order to distinguish the White House from a swan, we simply have to continue adding more
properties and attributes until the jury has no chance of confusing one with the other. For example, if I say
big, white, with wings, and is a building, this summarily disqualifies the swan. What I have done is place
restrictions on the term ‘White House’ so that the jury does not mistake it for a swan. I have narrowed the
range of interpretations the jury can give the term at the center of my presentation. If a prosecutor wishes to
use a word consistently throughout a scientific presentation and expects the jury to understand precisely
what he is talking about, he must put limits to its extension. The broader the meaning of a word, the weaker
the message that gets across:
- definition: A limitation the prosecutor places on a word’s utility or extent.
I clarify once again that, for the purposes of ordinary speech, this definition of definition is too rigid. The
limitation or restrictive definition is the scientific version of what a definition is. A strategic term that follows
this prescription has a chance of being used consistently throughout a dissertation.
A scientific definition is timeless and observer-less (i.e., proof-less). When initially brainstormed, it is usually
in a rudimentary form and therefore receives a broad interpretation. As we realize that the different versions
cause communication problems, we begin to restrict the word’s usage in order to express thoughts with
increasing precision. A perfect definition is one that has been refined to the point where everyone interprets
exactly the same thing.
In Science, we don’t define words with mathematical symbols like they do in the religion of Mathematical
Physics. We define them with words and sentences. It is also necessary to define the crucial terms on which
a theory hinges. The looser we define a word, the wider the range of interpretations, and the more dilute the
message that gets across will be. We need rigorous definitions to communicate a scientific theory precisely.
A prosecutor who leaves a strategic word in his theory undefined is not doing science because he cannot
possibly understand what he is talking about. He has left a loophole through which to escape when the
press starts asking the tough questions at the end of the presentation.
The word convex is a good example of a proof ‘definition’ used in Mathematical Physics (i.e., operational-
functional definition) and of how it differs from a true definition. The mathematicians define convex as:
- " A figure is convex if, for every pair of points within the figure, the segment
connecting the two points lies entirely within the figure." [19]
This definition requires you to run an experiment to certify that the two points indeed lie within the figure
before you can call the figure ‘convex’.
However, in Science, we don’t ‘construct’ definitions step by step (i.e., prove them). We define them before
we do anything with them:
- " convex: Having a surface or boundary that curves or bulges outward, as the
exterior of a sphere." [20]
I am not saying that this definition is correct. I am saying that this example typifies the correct form a
scientific definition should have. Now we can run the experiment that the previous definition asked us to
run because we have a standard with which to measure success.
While we’re at it, let’s also clarify that a definition is not the same as meaning. A definition is what a
prosecutor proposes. Meaning is what the juror gets out of it. Meaning has to do with how a definition is
interpreted. If a definition is on the emitting end, meaning is on the receiving end. A prosecutor issues
definitions. A juror infers meaning. A prosecutor acts as his own juror.
6.0 Dynamic concepts
Relativists run into yet more trouble with dynamic concepts. In their ridiculous efforts to prove their
definitions, the mathematicians have ended up converting static concepts into dynamic concepts:
- " Whichever definition one chooses, one must then prove that it has the properties
one wants…a ‘construction-definition’ " [21]
[Thus, Weyl ends up 'proving' what a line is by constructing it footprint by footprint
or filming the trajectory of a dot!]
" For example, the weight of an object may be operationally defined in terms of the
specific steps of putting an object on a weighing scale... what's being defined is
how to measure weight"[3]
[In other words, the idiots of Mathematics don't tell you what they mean by weight.
They're already at the next step measuring it! What does measurement have to do
with Physics or with definitions? This is strictly a mathematical pursuit.]
" parallel: (of straight lines) lying in the same plane but never meeting no matter how
far extended." [22]
[So? Is the equal sign ( = ) comprised of parallel lines? How far should we extend them
before we are satisfied that they are parallel? I thought parallel and perpendicular were
static concepts!]
- The word parallel can only be used consistently if we use the equidistant version of the definition. Only
then is it a static concept as it should be. The intersection version, the one that dares you to extend the
lines towards infinity, is a proof disguised as a definition and thus unscientific. Mathematics deals
exclusively with dynamic situations. The mathematicians have no use for qualitative, static concepts.
Therefore, it was predictable in retrospect that the bozos of Mathematics would have eventually scrapped
the equidistant version and replaced it with the intersection version. The mathematicians deal with
geodesics (motion) not with lines (architecture). In Mathematics it is irrelevant whether something is
parallel. Mathematics is interested in 'how' and not in 'what' or 'why'.
In his example of the IQ test, Harrison does not define the word intelligence. Instead, he makes a scale
pertaining to an unknown parameter and hopes you figure out what it is that he was talking about for the
last two hours.
- " An ‘operational definition’ is just a well-defined repeatable experimental procedure
whose result defines a word or words… An operational definition of intelligence…
could be: I administer the Stanford-Binet IQ test to a person and score the result.
The person’s intelligence is the score on the test…" [13]
If we accept his ‘operational’ definition of intelligence, we end up with idiotic conclusions. Assume that you
are lucky or that you cheat on Harrison’s IQ test and answer all the questions correctly. His method says
that you are more intelligent than the guy who studied for three months and got one answer wrong. So,
what did we learn about intelligence? What does the word intelligence mean?
The definition of a dynamic concept is really not that much different than that of a static concept except that
we use adverbs to characterize and qualify it. We don't use mathematical symbols to define scientific words.
We use words of ordinary grammar. Thus, the definition of energy is not E = m c² because this doesn't tell us
what the word energy refers to. This just tells us how much. The 'ability or capacity to do work' is the correct
format of a scientific definition. The more precise the definition, the greater the chances the jury has of
understanding the theory faithfully.
7.0 The 'tree-in-the-forest' school of thought of Mathematical Physics
Operational definitions have led the mathematicians and philosophers to the tree-in-the-forest school of
thought. Does a tree that falls in a forest makes a sound if there is no one to hear it? Of course, only the
stupid idiots of Mathematical Physics ponder such questions and get into all kinds of arguments. To settle
the matter between them, the teams prepare sensitive equipment and head for the forest to test the
'hypothesis'. Eventually, one group writes a seminal paper and gets a Nobel Prize for its contribution to
man's knowledge of sound or trees or whatever.
The mathematicians routinely rely on idiotic 'tree-in-the-forest' reasoning to answer mundane questions.
Neils Bohr and Werner Heisenberg were two not-so-bright individuals who developed the 'tree-in-the-forest'
reasoning into an art. They alleged that whether there is a reality out there depends on the perception of a
human (i.e., experiment). So successful were these two heroes of Mathematical Physics that they created
the 'tree-in-the-forest' Copenhagen Interpretation. If you have nothing better to do and want to have a good
laugh, I suggest you visit the school and listen to the scholars.
In Science, this question is a no-brainer. The scientific method requires the prosecutor to define the crucial
words that make or break his theory. Once he defines the strategic words, in this case sound and noise,
whether a tree makes a thump flows from these definitions. We're done. We don't prove definitions in Science.
This is an activity that is solely confined to Mathematical Physics.
Perhaps the most famous and ludicrous 'tree-in-the-forest' fib ever sold is Schrödinger's Cat, which
coincidentally comes from the same generation of mathematical claque of the Roaring 20s to which Bohr
and Heisenberg belonged. Just about everyone in relativity believes in this 'intellectual' milestone even today.
The idiot of Mathematics argues that whether a cat is dead or alive is an issue that must be resolved by a
trained veterinarian. Meanwhile, until the stagecoach arrives, the cat is in limbo somewhere between heaven
and hell.
Again, in Science, this dead-cat issue is a no-brainer. Like with the falling tree, we simply need to define the
crucial words that make or break our theories, in this case, the words dead and alive. It follows from these
definitions that a cat is either dead or alive before the doc puts the stethoscope to its heart. Likewise, whether
God or a particle exists hopefully is not an issue that we must resolve with a test or with verification. Whether
you believe or don't believe that God exists is irrelevant. God exists or doesn't whether you like it or not!
- 8.0 Should we define every word in a scientific presentation
The cynical devil’s advocate may make a final stand. Why doesn’t the prosecutor redefine every word that
he plans to use in his theory, including but, the, and it? That way he wouldn’t have to worry about the jury
mistaking a word of art for its ordinary meaning. Can’t the prosecutor just invent a new word if he is
proposing a new concept?
Locke rightfully argues that this is unnecessary:
- " a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great use for the
improvement of knowledge" (Bk. III, Ch. 3) [23]
" If all names were definable, it would be a process in infinitum." (Bk III, Ch. 4) [24]
I think most people would agree. It would be impractical and unnecessary for the prosecutors to go to the
extreme of inventing a new language every time they introduce a new theory. The purpose of language is to
communicate ideas.
- " When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood: and the end
of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the
hearer." (Bk. III, Ch. 2) [25]
For the purposes of a presentation, the approximate meanings and ordinary definitions of the great majority
of words that the prosecutor will use are more than adequate. The words the prosecutor must absolutely
define (especially upon request) are those on which his theory hinges: words of art. If relativists invoke the
word energy to explain an important aspect of their theory, it may not be relevant to tell the jurors what they
mean by but or it, but they surely must tell us what they mean by energy. In fact, what the prosecutors are
actually doing when restricting a strategic word’s usage is refining its meaning so that the jury does not
confuse it with its ordinary meaning. The prosecutors are putting the jurors on notice that it’s not business
as usual. The role of the juror is to watch out for circular definitions, proofs presented as definitions, or
definitions used inconsistently in the presentation.
I further propose the principle that a theorist may define a word any way he wishes. Science would make little
progress if the prosecutor were compelled to adhere to tradition and authority. The introduction of a new,
refined, or restrictive definition of a word has the purpose of highlighting it for the jurors. It puts them on
notice that the word will have a particular meaning for the purposes of the instant case.
- Module main page: A relativist believes that a hypothesis is a prediction
Pages in this module:
- 1. What is a hypothesis?
2. A hypothesis demands an exhibit
3. This page: A scientific definition is one that can be used consistently
4. The scientific method demands a statement of the facts
5. A show of hands does not establish a fact
| Strongman Bill |
| breaking the lame theories of Mathematical Physics with the strength of his definitions |
| Sorry, Bill! But in order to define the word position I must throw you through the air. Once I have your speed and the time it takes for you to hit the ground, I can calculate your position. |
| Where did you ever get the idea that we're sitting on a cake? This is a cake, what I'm holding in my hands: The recipe I used to make it! |
- ________________________________________________________________________________________
- Copyright © by Nila Gaede 2008